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Background: In 2009, a large meningitis A epidemic affected a broad region of northern Nigeria and southern
Niger, resulting in more than 75 000 cases and 4000 deaths. In collaboration with state and federal agencies,
Me´decins Sans Frontie`res (MSF) intervened with a large-scale vaccination campaign using polysaccharide
vaccine. Here the authors analyze the impact (cases averted) of the vaccination response as a function of the
timing and coverage achieved.
Methods: Phenomenological epidemic models were fitted to replicate meningitis surveillance data from the
Nigerian Ministry of Health/WHO surveillance system and from reinforced surveillance conducted by MSF in
both vaccinated and unvaccinated areas using a dynamic, state–space framework to account for under-report-
ing of cases.
Results: The overall impact of the vaccination campaigns (reduction in meningitis cases) in Katsina State,
northern Nigeria, ranged from 4% to 12%. At the local level, vaccination reduced cases by as much as 50%
when campaigns were conducted early in the epidemic.
Conclusions: Reactive vaccination with polysaccharide vaccine during meningitis outbreaks can significantly
reduce the case burden when conducted early and comprehensively. Introduction of the conjugate MenAfriVac
vaccine has reduced rates of disease caused by serogroup A Neisseria meningitidis in the region. Despite this,
reactive campaigns with polysaccharide vaccine remain a necessary and important tool for meningitis outbreak
response.
Keywords: Meningitis surveillance, Neisseria meningitidis serogroup A, Nigeria, Polysaccharide vaccine, Vaccination outbreak response
Introduction
The epidemiology of meningitis in the African meningitis belt is
complex, with seasonal increases in invasive disease and periodic,
though unpredictable, large-scale outbreaks.1–3 Many bacteria
contribute to seasonal cases of cerebrospinal meningitis (Neisseria
spp, Haemophilus influenzae, Streptococcus pneumoniae), but
large-scale epidemics are predominantly caused by Neisseria
meningitidis serogroup A.1,2,4,5
Meningitis vaccination campaigns with a polysaccharide
vaccine that provided short-term immunity1,6 have traditionally
been reactive, beginning only after incidence reaches an outbreak
threshold.7,8 Given the limited vaccine supplies and resources
for conducting campaigns, this reactive approach also avoids
resources being allocated to areas where they would have
minimal impact. The threshold level for response has been
based on observed outbreaks to maximize the sensitivity and
the specificity of response.8 The threshold strategy necessarily
allows epidemics to progress to a detectable level by the time a
vaccination response is endorsed, resulting in a lag between out-
break identification and vaccination that can limit the impact of
campaigns. A new conjugate vaccine against N. meningitidis
serogroup A that is hoped to result in long-term immunity has
recently been deployed in the meningitis belt.1,6 Full coverage
with the conjugate vaccine is likely to take many years to achieve
and the possibility of epidemics caused by serogroups for which
the conjugate vaccine does not provide protection means that
the risk of epidemics, and the need for reactive vaccination strat-
egies, may continue for several years.
There has been little formal evaluation of the impact, in terms
of cases averted, of reactive vaccination campaigns for managing
meningitis outbreaks (though see references8–11). Model-based
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evaluation of the impact of vaccination campaigns12 is hampered
by uncertainties about the link between endemic carriage and
local or widespread outbreaks and a by a lack of detailed data
on meningitis carriage.1–3 Mechanistic models of carriage have
been developed for European settings3,13 but it is not clear that
these can be directly applied in the African context, because of
the differing environmental conditions and because European
disease outbreaks have been dominated by N. meningitidis
serogroup C.
In the study described here we took a comparative approach to
the quantitative evaluation of the impact of reactive vaccination
during the 2009 meningitis A outbreak in Katsina State, northern
Nigeria (Figure 1A). We estimated the meningitis cases averted as
a result of vaccination campaigns by fitting two phenomenologic-
al epidemic models that represent the potential extremes of men-
ingitis epidemiology to meningitis surveillance data from areas
with and without reactive campaigns: the first model assumes a
time-varying attack rate independent of incidence and the
second assumes that the attack rate is an increasing function of
the incidence of infection. As the reality of meningitis epidemi-
ology is likely to be intermediate to these two models, the two
together reflect bounds on the possible impact of vaccination
campaigns. By simulating from these two models, fitted to the
2009 outbreak in northern Nigeria, we compared the potential
impact of a simultaneous vaccination strategy to that achieved
using the current sequential strategy.
Materials and methods
Study area
In 2009, a large meningitis epidemic affected a broad region of
northern Nigeria and southern Niger, resulting in more than
75 000 cases and 4000 deaths.14 Neisseria meningitidis serogroup
A was identified as the main causative agent. In collaboration with
the Nigerian Federal and State Ministries of Health, the Nigerian
National Primary Health Care Development Agency and Nigeria’s
national program of immunization, Me´decins sans Frontie`res
Operational Center Paris (MSF-OCP) intervened in three states in
northern Nigeria (Katsina, Jigawa and Bauchi), supporting case
management, strengthening surveillance and organizing mass
vaccination campaigns.
Following guidance prepared by the International Coordinating
Group on Vaccine Provision for Epidemic Meningitis Control (com-
posed of representatives from MSF, the International Federation of
the Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies [IFRC], UNICEF and
WHO), MSF-OCP conducted vaccination campaigns in Katsina.
The campaigns targeted local government areas (LGAs) selected
on the basis of the attack rate (cases per 100 000 population), and
wards within each LGA selected by evaluating epidemic risk on the
basis of number of cases reported, population size and density.
The first vaccination campaign started on week 10 of 2009 and
the last started on week 19 in three LGAs. Campaigns used a
mix of trivalent (A+C+W135) and bivalent (A+C) polysaccharide
vaccine. Campaigns targeted all individuals aged between 2 and
30 years. A total of 1 302 951 individuals were vaccinated in
134 (of 361) wards in 18 (of 34) LGAs.
Weekly cerebrospinal meningitis cases and death reports for
the 34 LGAs of Katsina State were obtained from the WHO state
office. These data were collected through the usual Nigerian
state Ministry of Health (MoH) surveillance system, following the
WHO Integrated Disease Surveillance and Response (IDSR) tech-
nical guidelines. In brief, during the meningitis epidemic, health
facilities were required to record information for each suspected
meningitis case in specific IDSR line-lists. Each week, the data
were transmitted to the Disease Surveillance and Notification
Officer (DSNO) at the LGA level, where the data were aggregated
before being shared with the WHO state office. As part of its
support to the epidemic response, MSF reinforced this surveillance
system to ensure timely (weekly) monitoring of the epidemic. MSF
data collection started in week 6, with support in six health facil-
ities. Thereafter, MSF increased their support to cover 29 LGAs on
week 11 (91 heath facilities), and then the entire state by week 14
(up to 127 health facilities). As health facilities were enrolled, MSF
retrospectively reviewed health facility registers or IDSR reporting
forms (line-lists or weekly reporting forms) according to the regis-
tration procedure in place in the health facility. Following enroll-
ment, prospective data collection was supported through review
of the WHO-recommended case definition, completion of line-
lists, weekly reporting, and regular visitation by MSF case manage-
ment teams. Both WHO/MoH and the MSF-reinforced surveillance
Figure 1. (A) Katsina State (shaded) in northern Nigeria shares borders
with the states of Jigawa, Kano, Kaduna and Zamfara, and with the
Republic of Niger to the north. It has a population of 6 million. (B)
Annual reported cases of meningococcal meningitis in Katsina, 2001–
2008. (C) Weekly cases of meningococcal meningitis reported in Katsina
State in 2009 through Me´dicines Sans Frontie`res-reinforced and WHO
surveillance.
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relied on the same case definition and source information;
however, MSF teams collected the data directly from the health
facilities whereas WHO/MoH relied on transmission and compil-
ation of these lists through a multilevel reporting system, with
the possibility of loss in transmission.
The case definition of a suspected meningitis case was: any
person with sudden onset of fever (temperature of .38.58C
rectal or 38.08C axillary) and one of the following signs: neck stiff-
ness, altered consciousness or other meningeal signs. The WHO
data included weekly cases per LGA up to week 37 of 2009,
though no cases were reported after week 22, and recorded a
total of 9331 cases (Figure 1C). Data obtained from MSF-OCP
were the cases per ward from week 50 of 2008 to week 22 of
2009, a total of 20 617 cases. Throughout, we distinguish these
two data sources as WHO surveillance and MSF-reinforced surveil-
lance, respectively.
Yearly cases of cerebrospinal meningitis for 2001–2006 and
weekly cases of cerebrospinal meningitis for 2007 and 2008
were obtained from the State Ministry of Health (Figure 1B). LGA
and ward population sizes were obtained from Katsina State au-
thorities and are a linear extrapolation of the general population
census conducted in 2006 assuming a 3% growth rate. The ad-
ministrative vaccine coverage achieved during the 2009 vaccin-
ation campaigns per ward were obtained from MSF-OCP. For
LGAs where only a fraction of wards were vaccinated, the LGA-
level vaccine coverage was calculated as follows: vaccination
coverage (%) in the vaccinated wards multiplied by the percent-
age of the LGA population residing in the wards in which cam-
paigns were conducted.
Description of models
Pinner et al.9 proposed estimating the number of meningitis cases
averted as a result of vaccination campaigns by estimating a
weekly attack rate (AR) in the absence of vaccination from
regions where campaigns were not conducted and applying
that attack rate to those regions where campaigns were con-
ducted. The AR is assumed to vary with time, but is independent
of incidence; hence the model can be written as:
Iit+1binomial(Sit, ARt)
Sit+1 = (Sit − Iit)(1 − Vit)(0.85)
where It is the number of cases in location i and week t, St is the
number of susceptible individuals, and Vt is the proportion of the
population vaccinated in location i and week t. We assumed
that vaccine efficacy is 0.85;9 we assessed the sensitivity of our
results to this assumption by re-analyzing the data assuming
vaccine efficacy ranging from 0.5 to 1.0 (see Supplementary
Data). The form of this model assumes that the vaccination pro-
tects only those individuals that were vaccinated and has no
effect on carriage or transmission. Given that in Katsina State
there had been no major outbreaks of meningitis A nor any signifi-
cant vaccination campaigns in several years, we assume that the
entire population was susceptible at the start of the epidemic,
which is consistent with the assumptions of Pinner et al.9
The Pinner model ignores the role of transmission in the pro-
gression of a meningitis outbreak, and is equivalent to a model
of temporally varying environmental exposure. A recent longitu-
dinal study in Burkina Faso showed seasonal increase in N. menin-
gitidis carriage in the dry season, coincident with increased
incidence of disease, which is at least consistent with increased
transmission.15 Recognizing that N. menigitidis is directly trans-
missible, we construct an alternative model to evaluate the
number of cases averted as a result of vaccination campaigns
based on a model of directly transmitted infection. We can carica-
ture the dynamics of meningitis as an S–E–I–R–S type pathogen
(susceptible–exposed [carrier, non-infectious]–infectious–recov-
ered–susceptible). In the context of a single outbreak we can
assume that transition from temporary immunity to susceptibility
is trivial. Further, in the absence of data on carriage, we collapse
the carrier (E) and infectious (I) states into a single category
and treat the outbreak as a standard susceptible–infectious–
recovered (SIR)-type outbreak. This simplification of meningitis
epidemiology as an SIR-type outbreak assumes that all cases
during an epidemic are the result of transmission on the time-
scale of the epidemic; i.e. no cases are attributable to asymptom-
atic carriers progressing to severe disease. Therefore we can write
the number of new infections in location i and week t+1 as:









where bt is a time varying transmission rate, and I, S, and V are
as above, and N is the LGA population size. As above, we
assume that vaccine efficacy is 0.85 (see Supplementary Data
for sensitivity to this assumption). As with the Pinner model, the
transmission term is estimated using both the unvaccinated
and vaccinated LGA populations. Here, because infection is
directly transmitted, the probability of new infection is 0 when
there are no cases in the LGA. We allow the introduction of infec-
tion to LGAs through migration from neighboring LGAs where the
number of migrants, m, is an exponentially decaying function of
distance between LGAs and the parameter g controls the rate of
decay with distance.
As above, all individuals are considered susceptible at the start
of the epidemic. The time from infection to disease onset (infec-
tious generation period) is set at 1 week, which was coincident
with the time scale of the reported data. There is considerable un-
certainty about the infectious generation period for meningitis,
with published reports ranging from a few days16 to several
months.3 Greenwood et al.17 reported that .50% of secondary
cases occurred within 7 days of the index case in households,
which provides further justification for this time scale.
In practice, the epidemiology of a meningitis outbreak is likely
to lie somewhere between the Pinner model and the SIR-type
model. The Pinner model ignores the role of transmission and
therefore should result in a relatively low estimate of campaign
impact, while the SIR-type model emphasizes transmission
and therefore should result in a relatively high estimate of cam-
paign impact. We present the results of these two analyses as
measure of the potential bounds on the cases averted as a
result of vaccination campaigns.
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We fitted the parameters of the Pinner and SIR-type model using a
state–space modeling framework.18,19 State–space models
provide a probabilistic framework to predict the unobserved ele-
ments of a dynamic process (i.e. meningitis incidence), given
observed elements of the dynamic process such as reported men-
ingitis cases.18–22 In addition to predicting the unobserved ele-
ments of the system, state–space models facilitate the efficient
calculation of the likelihood function for the observed elements
of the system, thus allowing for statistical inference of the para-
meters of the dynamic process. State–space models are charac-
terized by two inter-related sets of equations with unknown
parameters: a ‘process model’ that represents the evolution of a
dynamic process through time (i.e. the true disease incidence
through time as a function of infection risk and immunization
coverage) and an ‘observation model’ that represents the obser-
vation of that process (i.e. the cases reported through the two sur-
veillance systems). Therefore the Pinner and SIR-type model
constitute alternate process models of the epidemic dynamics
through time. For the observation model, we made two assump-
tions: that the number of cases reported under the WHO surveil-
lance system each week is a binomial sample from the true
number of cases, with observation probability piWHO, and the
number of cases reported in the MSF-reinforced data each week
is a binomial sample from the true number of cases, with obser-
vation probability pR. The superscript i indicates that we estimated
a separate observation probability for the WHO surveillance
system for each LGA. We assumed that the MSF-reinforced data,
because of the direct data collection on site, had the same obser-
vation probability in all areas. The observation probability for both
data sources was considered as constant throughout the epidem-
ic and estimated from the surveillance data by fitting the state–
space model.
We fitted the full state–space model using a Bayesian Markov
chain Monte Carlo framework.19,20 Markov chains of the states,
Iit, the weekly attack rates, ARt, and the observation rates, pWHO
and pR were generated using the Metropolis–Hastings algorithm
with candidate values proposed using a random walk. We used
non-informative uniform priors for all parameters except the mi-
gration parameter, g, which was modeled as gamma distributed
with shape and scale parameter equal to three. Markov chains
were run for 100 000 iterations and the posterior was sampled fol-
lowing 50 000 iterations to allow for convergence.
Evaluation of campaign impact
For both the Pinner and the SIR-type model, we can evaluate the
expected epidemic by simulating realizations from models 1 and 2,
respectively, under the assumption that Vit is 0 for all locations and
all weeks. Because of the variability in the epidemic outcomes
without vaccination, the simulation was iterated 10 000 times
each with parameters drawn independently from their respective
posterior distributions. The mean of the predicted cases for each
LGA and week provided an estimate of the number of cases in
the absence of vaccination.
In practice, LGA populations were vaccinated after the inci-
dence had crossed a threshold level, leading to campaigns that
were sequential in time. An alternative would have been to vaccin-
ate all LGA populations simultaneously; such a strategy would
have resulted in more prophylactic vaccination in areas that
were not yet experiencing outbreaks, but could have been criti-
cized for not focusing effort on areas in crisis. To evaluate the po-
tential impact of simultaneous vaccine strategies we simulated
from the fitted models. To simplify the comparison to the fitted
models we considered only vaccination in those LGAs where vac-
cination was carried out in 2009; thus, if the campaign had been a
true mass campaign in all LGAs the predicted number of cases
would have been lower. We simulated mass campaigns occurring
on weeks 10–15.
Results
The outbreak of meningococcal meningitis began in the north of
Katsina State and spread through the entire state (and neighbor-
ing states of Jigawa, Bauchi and Kano) by week 12 of 2009
(Figure 1). The outbreak peaked in week 14 of the year and no
cases were reported after week 22.
The Pinner model estimated that the true number of cases,
correcting for under-reporting, was larger (26 531cases) than
did the SIR-type model (21 742 cases), but that the percentage
of cases averted as a result of the vaccination campaigns was
smaller (4.1% vs 11.7% cases averted; Table 1, Figure 2). The
greater predicted impact of vaccination campaigns in the
SIR-type model is expected, as the structure of this model pre-
sumes that vaccination limits onward transmission as well as pro-
tecting the vaccine recipient from disease. For both models, the
estimated LGA-level reporting rate for the WHO surveillance
data was highly variable; point estimates ranged from 0.06 to
Table 1. Mean and quantiles (2.5th and 97.5th) of the posterior distribution of values estimated for the Pinner model9 and the SIR-type
model for the 2009 meningitis outbreak in Katsina State, Nigeria
Pinner model9 SIR-type model
Epidemic size 26 531 (26 041, 27 095) 21 742 (21 456, 22 079)
Reporting rate from MSF-reinforced surveillance 0.778 (0.76, 0.79) 0.936 (0.92, 0.95)
Mean WHO reporting rate 0.430 (0.42, 0.44) 0.538 (0.52, 0.55)
Standard deviation for WHO reporting rate 0.215 (0.20, 0.23) 0.253 (0.24, 0.26)
% cases averted 4.1 (1.9, 6.2) 11.7 (8.6, 14.9)
MSF: Me´dicines Sans Frontie`res; SIR: susceptible–infectious–recovered.
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0.97 under the SIR model and 0.04 to 0.86 under the Pinner
model. Estimates were not significantly affected by the assump-
tion of 0.85 vaccine efficacy (see Supplementary Data).
At the scale of individual LGAs, the predicted impact of the
campaigns was highly variable (Figure 3). The SIR-type model pre-
dicted greater impact of the vaccine campaigns in all LGAs,
though the magnitude of the predicted impact from both
models was strongly correlated (Figure 3 inset). In general, the
estimated impact of vaccination was positively correlated with
the value of vaccine efficacy that we assumed (Supplementary
Data); under the Pinner model estimated impact ranged from
0.018 to 0.065 and under the SIR model estimated impact
ranged from 0.076 to 0.150 for vaccine efficacy of 0.5–1.0. The
predicted impact of the vaccination campaigns under both
models was greatest for campaigns that started early (Figure 4).
In particular, campaigns that started before the epidemic peak
(week 14) were predicted to have a higher percentage of cases
averted. For both models there was no significant positive correl-
ation between vaccine coverage and predicted impact. Note that
Figure 2. Model projections of meningococcal meningitis cases in Katsina
State, Nigeria in 2009, corrected for estimated under-reporting, for the
Pinner model9 and the SIR-type model. Light shading: 95% prediction
intervals for the true cases. Dark shading: 95% prediction intervals for
the epidemic in the absence of vaccination. Pinner model: see text; SIR:
susceptible–infectious–recovered.
Figure 3. Estimated impact of 2009 vaccine campaigns in Katsina State, Nigeria, under the SIR-type model in each local government area (LGA). Pie
graphs are located at a central point for each LGA. The size of each circle is proportional to the estimated number of cases. The numbers to the left
of each pie graph give the proportion of the target population vaccinated in the campaign (top) and the week of the year (2009) when the campaign
began (bottom). Grey wedges represent the estimated impact of the campaign (proportional reduction of cases). Inset shows the correlation between
the predicted impact under the Pinner9 and SIR-type models; dashed line represents a 1-to-1 relationship. SIR: susceptible–infectious–recovered.
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our measure of vaccine coverage reflects the total population of
the LGA that was vaccinated as not all wards in each LGA were
vaccinated. Thus, LGAs with low coverage may reflect campaigns
that targeted only a few wards. An alternative analysis using the
coverage achieved in the targeted wards similarly finds no signifi-
cant correlation between predicted impact and vaccination cover-
age (not shown). For those campaigns conducted after the
epidemic peak (after week 14), there was a significant positive
correlation (p,0.05) between vaccine coverage and campaign
impact.
Urban wards tended to cross the epidemic threshold faster
than did rural wards (ANOVA; p,0.05; Figure 5). Within each
LGA the vaccination response was prioritized to the urban wards
and those areas that were most heavily affected. The faster
epidemics (mean¼1 week earlier) in urban wards and prioritized
vaccination response at the ward level was not reflected in the
LGA-level epidemic models and may lead to some under-
estimation of campaign impact.
Under the predictions of both models, carrying out vaccination
in all remaining LGAs in week 15 with coverage as low as 25%
would have resulted in as many cases as in the staggered vaccin-
ation strategy that was used (Figure 6). Increasing vaccine cover-
age or earlier campaigns are predicted to have resulted in further
cases averted, though earlier campaigns are predicted to be more
effective than campaigns with higher coverage. Note that though
the Pinner model projects a greater reduction in terms of overall
cases, the projected size of the 2009 outbreak was larger under
this model as well.
Discussion
Before the rollout of the new conjugate vaccine, reactive vaccin-
ation with polysaccharide vaccine has been the standard re-
sponse to meningitis A outbreaks in sub-Saharan Africa.
Polysaccharide vaccines remain the only tool available to
control epidemics attributable to other serogroups that are circu-
lating in the region.5 Further, experience with measles vaccine
suggests that improved vaccination can result in increasingly epi-
sodic outbreaks.19 Therefore, while the immune landscape of
N. meningitidis is changing in response to the introduction of a
new vaccine, reactive campaigns are likely to remain a relevant
public health tool for the near term. While timely response is
always the goal, reactive campaigns are constrained by delays
in reporting, vaccine availability and logistics; in Niger and
Nigeria .60% of doses used in 2009 were received at or after
the peak of incidence.14 The relative impact of these campaigns
is often difficult to assess, because the impact of vaccination on
meningitis transmissibility and epidemiology is disputed, and
because comparative surveillance from nearby areas without
campaigns is rarely available. We addressed these two limitations
by taking a comparative approach to assessing the impact of vac-
cination campaigns, using two models that reflect extremes of
Figure 4. Impact of the 2009 meningitis vaccination campaigns (% cases averted) in Katsina State, Nigeria, as a function of the start week of the
campaign (x-axis) and the vaccine coverage achieved (y-axis) for the Pinner model9 and the SIR-type model. SIR: susceptible–infectious–recovered.
Figure 5. Distribution of the timing of the meningitis epidemic threshold
(10 cases per 100 000) in Katsina State, Nigeria, in 2009 at ward level.
Box plots are grouped into urban and rural wards in local government
areas (LGAs) that received polysaccharide vaccination (left) in 2009 and
those that did not (right). Boxes indicate the median, 25th and 75th
quantiles of the distribution of weeks; dashed lines extend to the earliest
and latest week in each category.
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the potential epidemiology and incorporating observations from
areas with and without vaccination campaigns.
While this comparative, empirical approach allows a basis for
the estimation of vaccination campaign impact, it remains a
fairly naı¨ve characterization of meningitis epidemiology. Though
debate continues about the relative contribution of transmission,
environmental and strain dynamic effects on the epidemiology of
epidemic meningitis,2,3,5,13,23 the application of more mechanistic
models in the African context is severely limited by a lack of data
on the role of meningococcal carriage. However, this situation is
changing through the efforts of the African Meningitis Carriage
Consortium. To develop predictive models of meningitis outbreaks
or consider a prospective evaluation of alternative response strat-
egies would require the development of models that explicitly
address these competing mechanisms and incorporate data on
bacterial carriage.
While the goal should always be to attain the highest coverage
possible, our comparative analysis of campaign impact across
LGAs suggests that speed of response should be emphasized. In
particular, under both models the number of potential cases
averted dropped significantly for campaigns that began after
week 14. The availability of good surveillance data is a significant
limitation to the speed of vaccination response. While the WHO
surveillance system tracked the progression of the epidemic
well in all LGAs, our analysis suggests that the epidemic was sig-
nificantly under-reported and highly variable at the LGA level. The
reinforcement of the surveillance system by MSF took time–it was
week 14 before all health facilities had MSF support for surveil-
lance; however, the reinforced surveillance revealed a higher inci-
dence of cases than was reported through the existing
system.This implies that, had these cases been reported immedi-
ately, the response threshold and the resulting campaigns would
have occurred earlier, resulting in improved outcomes. In many
settings good data on population size are poorly available, so
that vaccination response decisions based on incidence rates
are limited by uncertainties in both the numerator and the de-
nominator.
In practice, some vaccination campaigns occurred later
because the outbreaks occurred later in those LGAs. The 2009
MSF-OCP campaign in Nigeria vaccinated .3 million individuals
and delivered .28 000 courses of treatment at a cost of E5.4
million. The magnitude of these campaigns imposes significant
logistical constraints for the size of a simultaneous response.
Further, limited supply of polysaccharide vaccine necessitates
real-time decisions about allocation, to ensure the availability of
vaccine throughout the dry season. However, a strategy of
responding only after an LGA has crossed an epidemic threshold
results in consistent lags in vaccination response. A vaccination
response over a larger area, even if it achieves lower overall
coverage, may be a viable strategy if it tends to reduce the lag
between the onset of an epidemic and the campaign in areas
where outbreaks have not yet been detected. Simulations from
the fitted models suggest that the reduction in case burden
achieved in 2009 might also have been achieved with a lower
coverage vaccination strategy in all LGAs, if it were conducted
by week 15. Thus, as an outbreak spreads, the cost of moving
vaccination teams to new locations before high coverage is
achieved (e.g. at 75% rather than 90% coverage) might be
offset by the gains achieved by moving them more rapidly to
areas where outbreaks are just beginning. Clearly this recom-
mendation does not account for any additional costs of such a
coordinated campaign, or any political resistance to limiting vac-
cination response in already affected areas and directing
resources to areas not yet experiencing large epidemics.
However, it does suggest that this trade-off between campaign
timing and campaign coverage is worth considering when plan-
ning the scope of a vaccination response. Further, the observa-
tion that outbreaks progressed faster in urban wards confirms
the benefit of prioritized vaccination response at the finest
scale possible.
Figure 6. The expected size of the meningitis outbreak (as a proportion of that observed in 2009), predicted by the Pinner model9 and the SIR-type model
if all local government areas (LGAs) had been vaccinated simultaneously rather than in sequence. The x-axis gives the week of the simultaneous
campaign and the y-axis gives the vaccination coverage achieved in each LGA (assuming all LGAs receive the same coverage). Grey shading and
contour lines: size of the total outbreak as a proportion of the observed outbreak in 2009 in Katsina State, Nigeria. SIR: susceptible–infectious–recovered.
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The recent introduction of a new conjugate vaccine in the men-
ingitis belt has the potential to significantly change both meningi-
tis epidemiology and outbreak response policy. The conjugate
vaccine is not currently approved for use in outbreak response
outside of those areas where it has been already introduced;
the characteristics that make it attractive as a prophylactic
vaccine also recommend its utility for outbreak response. The
new vaccine is predicted to limit transmission of meningitis,24–27
which would suggest an impact of the conjugate vaccine in the
outbreak setting more like that predicted by the SIR model.
Further, the predicted long-lasting immunity would provide pro-
tective benefits beyond the reduction of a current outbreak.24–27
The potential for longer lasting immunity also makes strategies
such as the vaccination of neighboring, but not yet affected,
areas more cost effective because of the additional, long-term
benefit of protection from future outbreaks.
As with many vaccine-preventable diseases (e.g. measles, polio)
meningitis outbreaks remain a significant public health threat
even as vaccination coverage improves. Even if the conjugate men-
ingococcal vaccine is incorporated into routine vaccination sche-
dules, meningitis outbreaks may continue to be a threat. Further,
N. meningitidis serogroups not covered by the conjugate vaccine
(W135, X, C, B) continue to circulate in the meningitis belt and
may increase in prevalence with reduced competition from ser-
ogroup A. The results presented here suggest that lags in outbreak
detection attributable to imperfect reporting remain a significant
limitation to timely and effective campaigns. To that end, it is
useful to consider the limitations of previous vaccination cam-
paigns and evaluate strategies to improve timely reporting of
cases and rapid implementation of outbreak response in the future.
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(http://inthealth.oxfordjournals.org/).
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